Arguing in Good Faith about the
Constitution: Ideology, Methodology, and
Reflective Equilibrium
Richard H. Fallon Jr†
Nearly all of us who participate in constitutional argument in subjective good
faith share a second-order methodology of constitutional decision-making—that is,
an approach to working out both our first-order theories of constitutional interpretation and our judgments about appropriate results in particular cases. That shared
method involves a search for reflective equilibrium between our prior or intuitive
methodological assumptions (which sometimes may be vague or indeterminate) and
our intuitive judgments concerning the appropriate results in particular cases. If our
ex ante methodological theories are underdeterminate, reflection on new cases’ facts
will lead us to specify our premises more fully. Moreover, in instances of initial conflict between judgments of desirable case-specific outcomes and previously adopted
methodological commitments, the Reflective Equilibrium Hypothesis advanced in
this Essay holds that adjustment can occur on either end. If we argue about constitutional issues in good faith, normally we will adapt our judgments concerning correct results to methodological premises that we have previously endorsed. But sometimes reflection on new cases will provoke an elaboration, qualification, or
rethinking of methodological commitments. After advancing the Reflective Equilibrium Hypothesis as an explanatory theory of the main currents of constitutional argumentation, this Essay offers a brief normative defense.

INTRODUCTION
Nearly all of us who participate in constitutional arguments
in good faith share a second-order methodology of constitutional
decision-making. We obviously do not share the same first-order
methodology. There are famous disagreements among originalists, living constitutionalists, and advocates of moral readings, as
well as many others. But beneath the roiling surface of contestation and mutual recrimination, we mostly share a second-order
approach to working out our first-order methodological (and, simultaneously, our first-order substantive) positions. This shared
method involves a search for reflective equilibrium:1 just as we
† Story Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I am grateful to Jim Fleming, Andrew
Gold, Frank Michelman, and Larry Solum for extremely helpful comments and to Ephraim
McDowell for outstanding research assistance.
1
See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 20–21, 48–53 (Belknap 1971).
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evaluate our methodological premises partly in light of the results
that they yield, we simultaneously assess our intuitive judgments
concerning the appropriate results in particular cases in light of
our revisable methodological commitments. We have case-specific
intuitions in part because we know that constitutional law is interconnected with substantive morality in a variety of complex
ways.2 Yet most of us also believe that constitutional law has a
partial autonomy, grounded in respect for prior controlling authorities and in methodological integrity in determining what
prior authorities have established. In instances of initial conflict
between judgments of desirable case-specific outcomes and previously adopted methodological stances, the Reflective Equilibrium
Hypothesis that I advance in this Essay—which shares important
commonalities with a thesis developed by Professor Mitchell
Berman3—holds that adjustment can occur on either end.4
In advancing the Reflective Equilibrium Hypothesis that participants in normative constitutional discourse share a secondorder methodology of pursuing reflective equilibrium between
methodological principles and judgments involving desirable results in individual cases, my methodology is one of inference to
the best, most charitable explanation of familiar processes of argument and decision-making. In so asserting, I use the term
“best” in a partly normative sense that encompasses a version of
the principle of interpretive charity.5 For reasons that I explain
in Part III, rejection of the Reflective Equilibrium Hypothesis

2
Professor Larry Alexander argues that the idea of “legal intuitions” makes sense,
if at all, only “in cases where the original meaning is unclear.” Larry Alexander, Telepathic
Law, 27 Const Commen 139, 143–45, 149 (2010). As I argue, however, even modestly wellinformed observers can have legal intuitions that legal meaning is unclear, as well as intuitions concerning how legal indeterminacies should be resolved.
3
See generally Mitchell N. Berman, Reflective Equilibrium and Constitutional
Method: Lessons from John McCain and the Natural-Born Citizenship Clause, in Grant
Huscroft and Bradley W. Miller, eds, The Challenge of Originalism: Theories of Constitutional Interpretation 246 (Cambridge 2011). There are significant differences as well as
affinities. Whereas Berman develops his thesis largely as an argument against originalism, I explain why even originalists likely employ a reflective equilibrium methodology in
developing the details of their theories. My hypothesis is also more developed than Berman’s.
See id at 261 (acknowledging that he could not “advance the project very far”).
4
The second-order theory that I advance in this Essay is consistent with, but does not
depend on, the first-order theory advanced in my previous work. That theory makes a different use of the notion of reflective equilibrium. See generally Richard H. Fallon Jr, A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 Harv L Rev 1189 (1987).
5
The principle of charity calls for interpretations of another’s words or texts that,
in situations of possible doubt, “maximize the truth or rationality in the subject’s sayings.”
Simon Blackburn, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy 59 (Oxford 2d ed 2005).
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would leave no strongly plausible alternative to the Cynical Conclusion—as I call it—that much if not most methodological argumentation in constitutional law is a sham.
Many have embraced the Cynical Conclusion as an account
of constitutional decision-making by the justices of the Supreme
Court. As a frequent participant in constitutional arguments,
however, I would say that I almost invariably attempt to argue in
good faith and generally perceive my conversational partners as
proceeding on the same basis—even though I have no doubt that
ideology plays a large role in shaping the sometimes quite divergent conclusions that we reach.6 If others reason as I do, I would
like to believe that we do so not because we are cynical manipulators, but because we experience new cases as prodding us to enrich our understandings of constitutional law and practice. In order to do so, the Reflective Equilibrium Hypothesis maintains, we
think simultaneously about appropriate methodology and about
normatively attractive results in individual cases.
The Reflective Equilibrium Hypothesis should provoke a revision in widely shared thinking about principled judicial decisionmaking. The proponents of competing interpretive methodologies
typically cast their arguments in partly normative terms. After
someone has chosen an interpretive methodology, however, most
believe that rule-of-law principles forbid any deviation. My analysis suggests that commitments to interpretive methodologies are
and ought to be revisable, but that, in order to be normatively
defensible, revisions should be open and principled. We might
think of the ideal that I elaborate and defend as one of arguing
about the Constitution in good faith across the spans of time and
experience.
I. A PRACTICE-BASED DESCRIPTION OF THE JUSTICES’ ROLE
Most debate about interpretive methodology involves the
functions and obligations of ultimate decision-makers and, in particular, of Supreme Court justices. If we view constitutional theories as prescribing the methodological commitments to which the
justices should adhere, the choice of a methodology—and the related development of a second-order methodology for choosing a
methodology—will necessarily reflect the Court’s role in the
American constitutional order. I therefore begin with a bare6
For an illuminating exploration of the antithetical notion of arguing in bad faith,
see generally David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 Harv L Rev 885 (2016).
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bones description of the powers that the justices exercise, the constraints to which they are subject, and the legal and moral norms
that apply to them. It would obviously be impossible to give a deep
description of the justices’ role without taking stands on matters
of significant substantive and methodological disagreement. I believe, however, that enough common ground exists to permit a
shallow description of the justices’ central functions that captures
important areas of agreement while leaving open—and thus suggesting the possibility of the utility of a first-order interpretive
methodology in resolving—remaining disagreements.
A.

Core Elements of Legal Reasoning and Argument in
Constitutional and Statutory Cases

For purposes of seeking agreement on a thin description of
the justices’ function in resolving constitutional and statutory
cases, three core elements stand out.
First, the justices need to resolve cases within, or as dictated
by, the constitutive norms of the American legal system. Despite
disagreement about many things, all participants in legal debates
engage in the same “practice” in the sense in which philosophers
use that term: they join in an activity constituted by shared understandings of what they individually and jointly are doing.7 For
example, all accept the premise that the Supreme Court cannot
offer general dictates in the way that Congress can, but can only
decide cases and controversies.8 American legal practice also includes what Professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks called the
principle of institutional settlement, which “expresses the judgment that decisions which are the duly arrived at result of duly
established procedures” by institutions recognized as having legitimate authority “ought to be accepted as binding upon the
whole society unless and until they are duly changed.”9
Second, American legal practice is text centered, focused on
determining the correct resolution of legal issues in light of the
meaning of authoritative texts, including the Constitution. The

7
See Richard H. Fallon Jr, Constitutional Precedent Viewed through the Lens of
Hartian Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 NC L Rev 1107, 1118–21 (2008) (discussing the concept of a shared practice and citing sources).
8
See, for example, Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 Tex L Rev 73,
76–77 (2007).
9
Henry M. Hart Jr and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the
Making and Application of Law 4 (Foundation 1994) (William N. Eskridge Jr and Philip
P. Frickey, eds).
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preoccupation with the meaning of texts does not imply that extralegal norms of language usage invariably determine legal
meanings. Nevertheless, participants in legal practice understand themselves as engaged in efforts to identify the meaning of
preexisting authorities.10
Third, nearly everyone agrees, and everyone ought to agree,
that moral and practical judgments play a role in constitutional
adjudication.11 Significantly, moreover, moral or practical judgment functions on two levels. One involves the second-order selection of a theory or methodology, the other the first-order resolution of substantive, case-by-case issues that both settled norms
of practice and a justice’s methodological theory leave open.
The role of moral reasoning is most obviously evident in the
selection of an interpretive methodology—for example, originalism or some version of nonoriginalism. By a methodology, I mean
a set of standards—whether articulated or tacit—for resolving legal issues that the constitutive norms of the American legal system leave underdetermined. To count as a theory in this sense,
the standards from which a participant seeks guidance need not
themselves be wholly determinate, nor need they reflect any single, central organizing principle in the way that originalism and
textualism, for example, do. It would also count as a theory for
someone to embrace an eclectic approach, pursuant to which the
justices should sometimes adhere to the original meaning of constitutional language, but should sometimes permit constitutional
doctrine to pursue a common law–like course of evolutionary
development.12
Despite the capaciousness of my definition, there is an important limit on what can count as an interpretive methodology.
If someone were to say, “My methodology is just to follow the law,”
I—likely in common with most others who engage seriously in
constitutional debate—would recognize that claim as being mistaken, misleading, or possibly in bad faith.13 It is untenable to

10 See Richard H. Fallon Jr, The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications
for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U Chi L Rev 1235, 1243–44 (2015).
11 See Fallon, 100 Harv L Rev at 1204–09, 1245–48 (cited in note 4).
12 See Fallon, 82 U Chi L Rev at 1305–07 (cited in note 10).
13 For an argument to the contrary, see Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory
of Legal Change, 38 Harv J L & Pub Pol 817, 885–87 (2015). This countervailing argument
is plausible only if one understands applicable legal principles as counseling the exercise
of relatively open-ended judgment in order to resolve indeterminacies. To characterize
someone deciding on this basis as “just following the law” would be more misleading than
descriptively informative.
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maintain as a matter of sociological fact that recognized rules of
practice uniquely determine the correctness of a single methodological approach that is adequately determinate to resolve all
hard cases. Interpretive theories guide or determine decisionmaking in cases that are not controlled by clearly settled and unmistakably applicable rules of legal interpretation and that therefore require the exercise of normative judgment. Correspondingly,
the embrace of an interpretive methodology reflects an element of
normative judgment.14
It follows, moreover, that interpretive methodologies require
normative defenses. The appropriate terms of defense are, of
course, controversial. Nevertheless, any adequate defense must
address issues of legitimate judicial authority.
The notion of legitimate authority is an elusive one, about
which I say more later.15 In the sense familiar among legal philosophers, an authority is a person, institution, or text whose dictates alter the normative situation or obligations of others.16 In
one famous formulation, the dictates of genuine authorities provide content-independent reasons for action that arise from the
identity or status of the source of the dictates.17 We thus might
say that the Constitution provides public officials and judges with
legal and possibly moral reasons to do as it prescribes, regardless
of the officials’ judgment concerning the wisdom of the Constitution’s prescriptions. For now, suffice it to say that the defense of
a methodological theory must show how it respects the legitimate
authority of past, duly empowered decision-making institutions
as required by the principle of institutional settlement. Moreover,
insofar as past decision-makers have left a matter vague or unsettled, proponents of an interpretive theory must further show
how their framework would better endow judicial decisions with
legitimacy in the normative sense, or with a greater claim to be
respected or obeyed, than would rival approaches.18
14 See Fallon, 82 U Chi L Rev at 1298–1300 (cited in note 10); Richard H. Fallon Jr,
How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 Cal L Rev 535, 540 (1999).
15 See Part II.B.
16 For a discussion of authority, see generally H.L.A. Hart, Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons, in H.L.A. Hart, Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and
Political Theory 243 (Clarendon 1982). See also Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 Va L Rev 1931, 1935–40 (2008).
17 See generally Hart, Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons (cited in note 16).
See also Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 35–37 (Clarendon 1986).
18 On normative as distinguished from sociological and other possible senses of
“legitimacy,” see Richard H. Fallon Jr, Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 Harv L Rev
1787, 1794–1802 (2005).
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In addition to justifying their choice of a methodology, the
justices make, and indeed must make, case-specific moral, practical, and prudential judgments. Although interpretive methodologies aim to guide choice or judgment in disputed cases, there are
many instances, as I argue below, in which the leading versions
of well-known interpretive theories would not resolve a relevant
vagueness or ambiguity.
B.

Combining the Elements

Generalizing, we can say that the job of Supreme Court justices or other ultimate interpreters is to determine or establish
the meaning of the Constitution and laws of the United States,
within the sociologically grounded norms of legal practice, in light
of the legally and linguistically eligible meanings of authoritative
texts, arguably relevant history, and concerns about morally legitimate lawmaking authority and about morally and practically
desirable outcomes. This formulation is obviously—and, as I said
at the outset, I believe appropriately—very abstract. Although I
mean it to be relatively noncontroversial, I should point out that
I place great weight, going forward, on this formulation’s recognition of the need for normative judgment on two levels, one involving the choice of methodology, the other involving the desirability
of results in particular cases.
II. THE NATURE OF SECOND-ORDER OR METHODOLOGICAL
CHOICE
Although my Reflective Equilibrium Hypothesis ultimately
needs support from principles of interpretive charity and a reluctance to embrace the Cynical Conclusion that methodological argumentation in constitutional law is at best epiphenomenal, the
Reflective Equilibrium Hypothesis draws much of its strength
from its capacity to explain other phenomena, two of which I describe in this Part. The first involves the range of issues that a
complete interpretive theory would need to address. Almost inevitably, cases spin up issues on which schematic, bare-bones versions of leading theories prove indeterminate. The second phenomenon involves the normative standards—traceable to the
conditions of legitimate judicial authority—to which methodologies of constitutional adjudication are appropriately held. To say
that interpretive methodologies are appropriately held to normative standards is not, of course, to say that every participant in
constitutional practice tries to meet those standards. But if the
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relevant standards have moral as well as legal foundations, nonadherence cannot efface them.
A.

The Range of Choices That Justices Need to Make

Even a cursory examination will reveal the stunning complexity that interpretive methodologies would need to achieve in
order to address all of the issues, and the attendant legitimacy
questions, that participants in legal debates inescapably encounter. If ex ante methodological commitments are underdeterminate or otherwise fail to yield adequate answers, then good-faith
participants in constitutional debate will need to enrich or revise
their theories as they go along.
1. What sense of “meaning” matters most?
Although all agree that legal interpretation aims to ascertain
the meaning of constitutional and statutory language, “meaning”
can have many meanings. If so, a question arises concerning
which sense of meaning is controlling in particular contexts.
Perhaps the paradigmatic sense of legal meaning is “contextual meaning as framed by shared presuppositions of speakers
and listeners, including shared presuppositions about application
and nonapplication.”19 This, roughly, is what textualists have in
mind when they refer to the meaning of legal language “in context,”20 and it approximates what many originalists contemplate
when they refer to the original public meaning.21 To take a plain
example, Article II of the Constitution limits eligibility for the
presidency to “natural born Citizen[s].”22 Insofar as purely semantic or literal meaning is concerned, this language might exclude
those whose mothers gave birth by cesarean section, those born
abroad, or both. We have no difficulty, however, in concluding
that it does not refer to those born by cesarean section, because
we impute shared values or concerns (at least to this extent) to
those who wrote the provision and to the audience to whom they
addressed it.

19

Fallon, 82 U Chi L Rev at 1244–48, 1259, 1273–74 (cited in note 10).
Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 Harv J L & Pub Pol 65, 66
(2011). See also John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 Colum
L Rev 70, 79–80 (2006).
21 See, for example, Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content,
89 Notre Dame L Rev 479, 497–500 (2013).
22 US Const Art II, § 1.
20
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As this example suggests, contextual meaning is not necessarily the same as semantic or literal meaning.23 With that distinction in mind, we can consider the Equal Protection Clause,
which provides that “No State shall . . . deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”24 At the time of
the Clause’s ratification, almost no one understood it as prohibiting most forms of gender-based discrimination, and no state that
mandated race discrimination in public education felt obliged to
alter its practices. Nevertheless, we might say that the literal or
semantic meaning of the Equal Protection Clause bars some
forms of race- or gender-based discrimination: a woman or an
African American who is denied a benefit or opportunity solely
because of her gender or her race is denied the equal protection of
the laws in a literal sense, regardless of what the generation that
wrote and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment may have thought.
Modern constitutional prohibitions against gender and race
discrimination could also rest on what I have called the “real conceptual meaning” of the Equal Protection Clause.25 Some have argued that when the Constitution guarantees moral rights—such
as the right to the equal protection of the laws or to the freedom
of speech—it incorporates the moral meaning of those terms.26
“Intended meaning” is a different sense of meaning.27 In Eleventh Amendment cases, for example, the Supreme Court has focused less on what the Amendment’s language says than on the
Framers’ supposed intent or purpose of reestablishing a regime of
state sovereign immunity.28
In other cases, participants in legal debate appeal to a conception of “reasonable meaning” as measured in light of a provision’s central, ascribed purposes.29 Constitutional law exhibits
many examples of reliance on reasonable meanings, even if they
are not always recognized as such. A paradigm case comes from
the interpretation of otherwise-absolute constitutional language,
such as that of the First Amendment’s guarantees of freedom of

23

On this distinction, see Fallon, 82 U Chi L Rev at 1245–48 (cited in note 10).
US Const Amend XIV, § 1.
25 Fallon, 82 U Chi L Rev at 1239, 1248 (cited in note 10).
26 See, for example, Michael Moore, Moral Reality, 1982 Wis L Rev 1061, 1154–56;
Michael S. Moore, Moral Reality Revisited, 90 Mich L Rev 2424, 2480–83 (1992). See also
Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution 7–10
(Harvard 1996).
27 Fallon, 82 U Chi L Rev at 1239, 1249–50 (cited in note 10).
28 See, for example, Seminole Tribe of Florida v Florida, 517 US 44, 69–70 (1996).
29 See Fallon, 82 U Chi L Rev at 1239, 1250–51 (cited in note 10).
24
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speech and of religion, as contemplating exceptions that are necessary to protect a compelling governmental interest.30 Why do we
assume that otherwise-applicable rights involving speech, religion, and equal protection of the laws must sometimes yield to
compelling governmental interests? The answer lies in widely
shared, and thus widely imputed, notions of reasonable meaning.
Another sense of meaning manifests itself in justices’ reliance
on precedent to reach conclusions that otherwise would be linguistically difficult to sustain. In such cases, we can say that
whatever a provision’s original meaning, it has acquired an interpreted or precedential meaning that can thereafter furnish its legal meaning.31
Among these various senses of meaning—on each of which
the Supreme Court sometimes relies—a fully comprehensive constitutional theory might determine a uniquely correct solution for
every case. But the leading theories, including originalism, more
characteristically leave open which sense of meaning their methodology aspires to pick out.32 There can be multiple candidates to
supply a provision’s “original” meaning. In addition, nearly all
originalists and textualists accept that a provision’s interpreted
or precedential meaning should sometimes control,33 often without specifying precisely when or why.
2. What role should precedent play?
Defining the proper role of precedent in constitutional interpretation constitutes a challenge not just for originalists, but also
for practitioners of other methodologies. In the history of the
Supreme Court, no justices have ever categorically denied the capacity of precedent to authorize or require results contrary to
those that they otherwise would have reached in some cases.34 At
the same time, none has held that precedent should always prevail. Under these circumstances, justices whose theories accommodate precedent on a second-best basis must decide when to adhere to stare decisis and when to reject it. I do not know of anyone

30 See, for example, Brown v Entertainment Merchants Association, 564 US 786, 799
(2011); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc v City of Hialeah, 508 US 520, 533 (1993).
31 See Fallon, 82 U Chi L Rev at 1239, 1251 (cited in note 10).
32 See id at 1288–97.
33 See, for example, Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 413 (Thomson/West 2012); William Baude, Is Originalism Our
Law?, 115 Colum L Rev 2349, 2358–61 (2015).
34 See Fallon, 86 NC L Rev at 1129–30 (cited in note 7).

2017]

Arguing in Good Faith about the Constitution

133

who has advanced a plausible, rule-like formula for determining
when initially erroneous constitutional precedent should and
should not be overruled.
3. Which historical facts matter most?
History matters to constitutional interpretation in myriad
and complex ways. The result is an unending set of challenges for
originalists and nonoriginalists alike.35 Originalists agree that
Founding-era historical facts should frequently determine judicial decisions, but they disagree about, and sometimes seem to
make inconsistent judgments concerning, which historical facts
matter most—those bearing on the Framers’ intent, the “original
understanding” of constitutional language, or the Constitution’s
original public meaning.36 Although it is less widely emphasized,
nonoriginalists, too, frequently acknowledge the relevance to constitutional adjudication of Founding-era historical facts and occasionally seem to treat such facts as controlling outcomes. To cite
just two examples, in District of Columbia v Heller,37 involving the
Second Amendment, and in a number of cases involving the Eleventh Amendment,38 otherwise-nonoriginalist justices argued for
their preferred interpretations mostly on originalist historical
grounds. As a result, nonoriginalist theories confront the challenge of determining which Founding-era historical facts matter
under which circumstances.
Moreover, although appeals to history occur nearly ubiquitously in constitutional law, many involve postoriginalist history.
More specifically, they involve actions taken and judgments made
by public officials, judges, and the American people in the time
since constitutional language was ratified.39 Somewhat simplistically, we can think of constitutional history as unfolding in a
35 See generally Richard H. Fallon Jr, The Many and Varied Roles of History in Constitutional Adjudication, 90 Notre Dame L Rev 1753 (2015); Jack M. Balkin, The New
Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 Fordham L Rev 641 (2013).
36 See Fallon, 90 Notre Dame L Rev at 1762–72 (cited in note 35).
37 554 US 570, 640–62 (2008) (Stevens dissenting, joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer).
38 See, for example, Alden v Maine, 527 US 706, 760–808 (1999) (Souter dissenting,
joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer); Central Virginia Community College v Katz, 546
US 356, 364–69 (2006) (Stevens).
39 See, for example, National Labor Relations Board v Noel Canning, 134 S Ct 2550,
2560 (2014) (stating that “the longstanding practice of the government can inform our
determination of what the law is”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). See also Curtis
A. Bradley and Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126
Harv L Rev 411, 417–32 (2012).
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three-stage sequence. At Time One (T1), the Constitution was
written and ratified and acquired its original meaning or meanings. At Time Two (T2), also in the past, judges and other officials
interpreted or applied the Constitution. Now, in the present day
or Time Three (T3), we need to ask what bearing T2 judgments
and actions ought to have on constitutional adjudication.
This three-stage sequence gives rise to a multitude of issues
about the pertinence of various kinds of historical facts under the
principle of institutional settlement. Here are a few recurring and
schematic examples:


Following James Madison, nearly all agree that historical
practice can sometimes “liquidate” vague constitutional
language,40 but subsidiary questions exist about when
and how liquidation can occur and about whether a constitutional meaning, once liquidated, becomes unalterable thereafter.41



Potentially distinct from the concept of liquidation—because it can be broader—is that of a “historical gloss” on
constitutional meaning.42 If the Constitution’s meaning
can be glossed by history, one would need to work out the
details of the nature and limits of historical glossing.



Appeals to the significance of tradition occur in the opinions of originalist and nonoriginalist justices alike, sometimes apparently as an index of original public meanings,
but sometimes also as an independently relevant consideration.43 In either case, justices who make traditionbased arguments need accounts of how traditions are
properly identified and interpreted and of when they control constitutional outcomes.



A number of recent decisions have pointed to the novelty
of statutes’ design or purposes as a factor bearing on their

40 See Federalist 37 (Madison), in The Federalist 231, 236 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E.
Cooke, ed); Fallon, 90 Notre Dame L Rev at 1773–75 (cited in note 35).
41 See Fallon, 90 Notre Dame L Rev at 1774–75 (cited in note 35); Caleb Nelson,
Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U Chi L Rev 519, 527, 552–53 (2003).
42 Bradley and Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 417–24 (cited in note 39).
43 See James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution: For Moral Readings
and against Originalisms 5, 44 (Oxford 2015); Fallon, 90 Notre Dame L Rev at 1781–82
(cited in note 35).
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constitutionality.44 Such decisions raise questions about
which kinds of novelty function as markers of constitutional dubiety, and why, under which circumstances.


Insofar as the justices accept that judicial precedents
sometimes hold authoritative significance, they must resolve, and thus need methodologies for resolving, such subsidiary questions as how to identify what a precedent originally meant45 and when subsequent developments have
shown a precedent to be unworthy of further adherence.46

4. Is there a distinction between meaning and construction
or implementation, and if so, what norms govern proper
construction or implementation?
Increasingly, both originalist and nonoriginalist legal theorists have distinguished between constitutional meaning, on the
one hand, and constitutional construction or implementation, on
the other hand.47 The distinction reflects the premise that the
meaning or communicative content of constitutional or statutory
provisions—as of utterances in a variety of nonlegal settings—
may frequently be vague, ambiguous, or otherwise indeterminate.
If so, judges and justices must give legal language a determinacy
that it otherwise lacks. And the justices’ function in doing so, on
this view, differs from the initial task of discovering a provision’s
meaning. Examples of constitutional construction or implementation might include the strict judicial scrutiny formulation,48 the
“actual malice” test of New York Times Co v Sullivan,49 and the
due process balancing formula of Mathews v Eldridge.50 Whatever
difficulties may arise in attempting to draw lines between interpretation and implementation, designing tests such as these requires the justices to play a different role from that of identifying
44 See, for example, Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy v Stewart, 563 US
247, 260 (2011) (“Lack of historical precedent can indicate a constitutional infirmity.”).
45 See Fallon, 90 Notre Dame L Rev at 1789–91 (cited in note 35).
46 See id at 1788–89.
47 See Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty
120–31 (Princeton rev ed 2014) (providing an originalist perspective); Richard H. Fallon
Jr, Implementing the Constitution 37–44 (Harvard 2001) (providing a nonoriginalist perspective); Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning 1–19 (Harvard 1999).
48 For a discussion of the historical origins of the strict scrutiny formula, see Richard
H. Fallon Jr, Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L Rev 1267, 1273–85 (2007).
49 376 US 254, 279–83 (1964).
50 424 US 319, 332–35 (1976).
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what constitutional language or the past practices of Congress
and the president have established. So far, however, academic
constitutional theory has had little to say about how the justices
should perform the function of constitutional construction or
implementation.
5. The practical limits of ex ante constitutional theorizing.
The central point of my unfolding account of the diversity and
complexity of the issues that arise in constitutional adjudication
should now be incontrovertible: the justices routinely confront a
flow of issues that far outstrips the resolving power of any generic
version of the most familiarly debated constitutional theories.
B.

Issues of Legitimate Authority

When gaps in previously articulated interpretive methodologies manifest themselves, the participants in constitutional debate could decide contested cases by simply choosing whatever result seems normatively most attractive on the facts before them.
But empirical theories that portray participants in constitutional
argument as simply asserting their normative preferences whenever their preformulated methodological theories run out would
depict them as eliding, in a substantial set of cases, the concerns
that motivate the embrace of methodological commitments in the
first place. As noted above, those concerns involve issues of legitimate judicial authority.
Insofar as law and official action are concerned, questions involving morally legitimate authority apply most cogently to legal
systems as a whole.51 If the American legal system is legitimate,
then officials may have good reasons to adhere to its dictates, even
when they believe those dictates misguided.52 Nevertheless, there
is a derivative sense in which we can ask about the legitimate
authority of courts to decide cases in particular ways.
Whenever and however courts decide cases, they hold themselves out as legitimate normative authorities in a double sense.
First, pursuant to the principle of institutional settlement,53 they
claim authority to make binding decisions concerning what past

51 See Frank I. Michelman, Is the Constitution a Contract for Legitimacy?, 8 Rev
Const Stud 101, 105–07 (2003).
52 For a discussion of the Constitution’s legitimacy, see Fallon, 118 Harv L Rev at
1802–13 (cited in note 18).
53 See text accompanying note 9.

2017]

Arguing in Good Faith about the Constitution

137

normative authorities (such as those who wrote and ratified the
Constitution) have established. Second, the Supreme Court
claims legitimate authority to resolve prior legal indeterminacy
and, for all practical purposes, to establish law for the future.54
Because the Supreme Court must both determine and enforce
the dictates of past authorities and, in cases of relevant indeterminacy, establish law for the future, constitutional debate and interpretation are, inevitably, simultaneously backward-looking
and forward-looking.55 On the one hand, the justices must respect
the principle of institutional settlement. On the other hand, authorities such as the Constitution are not self-interpreting. They
may be vague or ambiguous in relevant ways, and in some cases
they may conflict with one another.56 Especially in cases of doubt,
the justices, looking to the future, must shape their decisions in
light of the ultimate foundation of all claims of normative authority—whether those of the Founding generation, the legislature, or
the courts—in the capacity of those who assert authority to decide
the issues in question either wisely, procedurally fairly, or both.57
In principle, it may be imaginable that the backward- and
forward-looking aspects of issues of legitimate authority, as they
present themselves in constitutional disputes, could be held separate. One might say that judges appropriately exercise forwardlooking normative judgment, on terms that then would require
moral justification, only when the law as established by past authorities is genuinely indeterminate. It is highly doubtful, however, that most human beings could maintain this rigid distinction as a psychological matter when they must decide how past
authorities should be interpreted under circumstances in which
some possible interpretations would have attractive and others
baleful consequences. As illustrated by the range of choices that
justices need to make in adjudicating cases, it also seems plain
that issues of arguable indeterminacy present themselves with
considerable frequency in constitutional debate.
54 See, for example, Cooper v Aaron, 358 US 1, 18 (1958); Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, 505 US 833, 854–69 (1992).
55 See Joseph Raz, On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries, in Larry Alexander, ed, Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations 152,
176–80 (Cambridge 1998).
56 See Nicole Roughan, Authorities: Conflicts, Cooperation, and Transnational Legal
Theory 105–07 (Oxford 2013).
57 Roughly speaking, the two classic grounds for claims of legitimate authority involve substantive wisdom or insight, on the one hand, or fairness in procedures or in the
allocation of power—as is asserted, for example, in attempts to ground legitimacy in democracy or the will of the people—on the other hand. See, for example, id at 29–31.
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In any event, every question of constitutional interpretation
subsumes the question: How ought a decision-making authority
decide such that its decision will possess normative legitimacy
and, thus, deserve respect and adherence? An interpretive theory
or methodology must observe a number of constraints in order to
possess legitimacy-conferring capacity. For example, it must employ a reasonably reliable method for ascertaining relevant facts
and must appeal only to reasonable (even if not universally accepted) normative premises. A further consideration involves reasonable consistency or good faith in the application of a decisionmaker’s interpretive premises from one case to the next. A failure
of procedural regularity in the application of interpretive premises, or an acknowledgment that reliance on such premises is
wholly opportunistic, would deeply compromise any ultimate
decision-maker’s claim to be exercising legitimate authority—
especially in determining what past authorities have established—as distinguished from raw political power.58
C.

The Inescapability of Theoretical Commitments

Although I have emphasized the virtual impossibility of developing an ex ante constitutional theory adequate to resolve the
full flood of questions that future cases will bring to the fore,
methodological commitments are unavoidable. To participate in
constitutional disputes, one must make arguments. And those arguments frequently raise, and reciprocally must respond to, questions about legitimate judicial authority to which methodological
claims and premises offer answers. To see the force of this fundamental but intuitively obvious point, consider the case of Justice
Stephen Breyer, who often has expressed wariness of unyielding
doctrinal and methodological commitments.59 Although disavowing the embrace of any overarching and determinate theory,
Breyer inevitably makes methodological commitments through
the positions that he adopts in the decision of cases. In National
Labor Relations Board v Noel Canning,60 for example, he acknowledged that a clear original meaning—if there were one—would
authoritatively determine the scope of presidential power under

58

See generally Fallon, 87 Cal L Rev 535 (cited in note 14).
See, for example, Van Orden v Perry, 545 US 677, 700 (2005) (Breyer concurring in
the judgment) (“While the Court’s prior tests provide useful guideposts . . . no exact formula
can dictate a resolution to [ ] fact-intensive cases [under the Establishment Clause].”).
60 134 S Ct 2550 (2014).
59
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the Recess Appointments Clause in the absence of an on point judicial precedent.61 One would expect him to honor that commitment, and indeed to generalize from it, in subsequent cases.
III. AN INFERENCE TO THE REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM
HYPOTHESIS AS A SHARED SECOND-ORDER METHODOLOGY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT AND DECISION
Against the background of Parts I and II, I can now elaborate
and defend the Reflective Equilibrium Hypothesis that good-faith
participants in constitutional debate share a second-order decisionmaking methodology. As stated in the Introduction, the Reflective
Equilibrium Hypothesis asserts that those of us who care about
legal and normative legitimacy in both its backward- and forward-looking aspects, and who embrace methodological premises
in the course of arguing about particular cases, attempt to refine
our interpretive theories on an ongoing basis as new cases present
fresh challenges. More specifically, the Reflective Equilibrium
Hypothesis postulates that we employ a reflective equilibrium
methodology in which we consider the defensibility of our methodological commitments and our provisional judgments concerning the normative desirability of particular outcomes in light of
one another.
For the most part, new cases may not present occasions for
substantial rethinking. Among other things, I assume that most
of us have a relatively strong presumption in favor of adhering to
the methodological premises that we have endorsed in the past.
Sometimes, however, previously embraced premises may fail to
resolve some of the potential issues that I sketched in Part II. If
so, we need to refine our interpretive approaches or make new
commitments. And sometimes new cases may provoke a rethinking of previously accepted methodological premises. These claims,
I should emphasize, hold as much for originalists as for nonoriginalists, for no off-the-rack originalist theory of which I am
aware comes remotely close to resolving all of the questions that
Part II identified. For example, it is easy to imagine an originalist
refining her theory on a case-by-case basis to specify: the circumstances, if any, under which the literal or semantic meaning of a
constitutional provision should count as its relevant original meaning, despite evidence of a different or narrower original contextual
meaning; when, if ever, precedential or interpreted meaning, or
61

Id at 2564–65 (Breyer).
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evidence of a historical tradition, should prevail over contrary evidence of original contextual meaning; when original meaning is
sufficiently vague or indeterminate for historical liquidations or
glosses to possess controlling authority; and whether, when, and,
if so, how courts should go about constitutional construction or
implementation in cases involving vague original meaning.
Descriptively, the Reflective Equilibrium Hypothesis makes
sense of a variety of crucial data points that emerged in Parts I
and II, including all of the following:


Interpreters’ normative values exert a significant influence on their constitutional judgments. To insist otherwise is to deny reality. The Reflective Equilibrium Hypothesis responds to this phenomenon by postulating that
justices’ normative values influence not only their choice
of interpretive theory, but also their case-by-case specifications or revisions of their theories.



For those who engage in constitutional argument, the embrace of theoretical or methodological premises occurs,
like it or not. Participants in constitutional argument necessarily take positions about which arguments are good
and which are bad. In doing so, they presuppose the validity or invalidity of theories or methodologies. The Reflective Equilibrium Hypothesis provides a charitable explanation of how asserted premises accrue over time and
relate to one another.



Constitutional practice routinely generates issues that
leading constitutional theories fail to resolve and, what is
more, that no human theory designer could plausibly
have anticipated. As a result, the emergence of unforeseen categories of cases can almost self-evidently put
strain on and provoke reconsideration of previously articulated methodological premises. The Reflective Equilibrium Hypothesis is, in many ways, grounded in this empirical observation.



For reasons involving the legitimacy of judicial authority, constitutional decision-making appropriately has a
forward-looking aspect, concerned with the establishment of just rules for the future, as well as a more widely
recognized backward-looking aspect, rooted in an obligation to respect the legitimate authority of past decisionmakers to lay down rules binding on the future. Both of
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these kinds of legitimacy-based concerns bear on assessments of appropriate outcomes in many contestable cases
and also on evolving judgments with respect to soundly
defensible interpretive methodologies. The Reflective
Equilibrium Hypothesis accommodates the resulting normative demands by recognizing the importance of legitimacy at both the first- and second-order stages of judicial
methodology.
Besides possessing impressive descriptive capacity, the Reflective Equilibrium Hypothesis offers a charitable explanation of
the phenomena that support it. To begin with, the Reflective
Equilibrium Hypothesis depicts participants in constitutional argument as adopting an approach that I believe to be eminently
sensible. I see no reason to think that advance settlement of all
methodological questions would always be better than case-bycase decision-making. Normative legitimacy claims are too complex and tangled for all of the issues that have arisen in the past
and will arise in the future to permit sensible resolution on a onceand-for-all basis.
The Reflective Equilibrium Hypothesis also allows the possibility that those of us who engage in constitutional debate in what
we experience subjectively as good faith genuinely do so. And it
invites us to view our co-debaters as proceeding in similar good
faith, even when they embrace methodological positions that initially surprise us in support of conclusions that they obviously
find ideologically congenial.
In my view, the Reflective Equilibrium Hypothesis draws further strength from comparisons with two rival accounts of the role
of methodological premises or theories in constitutional argument. The first imagines that most participants come to constitutional debates with fixed, reasonably determinate methodological
positions and adhere to them no matter what. But this position is
untenable in both its empirical and its normative dimensions. No
one has a comprehensively determinate methodological theory.
And once we acknowledge our incapacity to identify all relevant
methodological and legitimacy-based challenges in advance, we
should reimagine some of our commitments as open to rethinking
when new issues reveal deficiencies in our prior reasoning.
Second, we should consider the Cynical Conclusion that
methodological debate is entirely strategic and that substantive
political preferences concerning outcomes in individual cases always dominate articulated methodological premises. Many have
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advanced versions of the Cynical Conclusion to characterize the
behavior of Supreme Court justices.62 Perhaps the justices are a
breed apart. But I think we may gain perspective—on both the
justices and ourselves—if we provisionally lump together all who
engage seriously in constitutional argumentation. If true, the
Cynical Conclusion would unmask most or all of us as regularly
arguing in bad faith. It would also unmask us as indifferent to the
backward-looking aspect of legitimate judicial authority.
Insofar as we care about legitimate judicial authority—and I
think many of us do—it would be disappointing to conclude that
our arguments are more self-serving and sophistic than sincere. I
think, moreover, that our outrage when others betray their methodological commitments reflects a deep-rooted belief that constitutional argument can, should, and frequently does proceed in
good faith.
Having introduced two possible rivals to the Reflective Equilibrium Hypothesis,63 I should briefly consider what might appear
to be an additional candidate to explain the role of methodological
argumentation in constitutional debate. What I call the Fainthearted Commitments Hypothesis holds that methodological arguments and prior methodological commitments matter in constitutional cases, but only when the practical stakes remain
relatively low.64 When the stakes grow large, and when a methodological theory would dictate results that a purported adherent
deems substantively objectionable, nearly everyone, this hypothesis continues, will ignore or wriggle sophistically out of her commitments. Some might cite Bush v Gore65 as evidence for the
Fainthearted Commitments Hypothesis. Whether or not one
agrees with that example, others will spring to nearly everyone’s
mind.
The Fainthearted Commitments Hypothesis seems to me
both correct and important insofar as it maintains that many of
us will adhere to our previously articulated methodological principles only up to a threshold, beyond which the strains of commitment become unbearable. But if we assume that most of us will
62
See, for example, Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court 2004 Term—Foreword:
A Political Court, 119 Harv L Rev 31, 34, 39–41 (2005) (arguing that the Supreme Court
is a “political organ” when deciding constitutional cases).
63 There are undoubtedly more.
64 See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U Cin L Rev 849, 862–64
(1989) (defending originalism but acknowledging that his commitment to originalism
might prove “faint-hearted”).
65 531 US 98 (2000) (per curiam).
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normally adhere to our commitments, but recognize exceptions
for extraordinary cases, we can also imagine that the process for
determining the threshold above which commitments cease to
hold involves a reflective equilibrium methodology. The Supreme
Court’s iconic decision in Brown v Board of Education of Topeka66
furnishes a possible example. Some of the justices appear to have
thought the invalidation of school segregation inconsistent with
their normal methodological premises.67 If so, their decisions to
join the unanimous Brown majority might have reflected a conclusion—reached via a process of back and forth thinking aimed
at achieving reflective equilibrium—that some of the methodological strictures that govern normal cases cease to bind in cases exhibiting sufficiently urgent moral stakes. Insofar as reasoning
about exceptions to normally governing methodological commitments proceeds on a basis such as this, the Reflective Equilibrium Hypothesis could subsume the Fainthearted Commitments
Hypothesis.
But an admitted difficulty attends this conclusion. Although
I think it plausible that the best prescriptive constitutional theory
might include methodological principles that apply only up to a
consequentially specified threshold, the prospect of bad faith may
again rear its head unless those who make only fainthearted commitments so acknowledge. Speaking normatively, I would endorse a principle of public disclosure in cases in which participants in constitutional argument believe that exceptional
circumstances justify deviation from principles that they continue
to endorse. I must acknowledge, however, that such a discipline
may not be widely observed in practice.
In some cases of apparent inconsistency, a more innocent explanation may of course exist: in the course of case-by-case, casuistical argument, we may embrace methodological premises in
some cases that we would reject in others without noticing the
variations in our positions. If so, the test of our bona fides would
come if the inconsistency caught our attention. In that case, if we
really argue in the good faith that many of us think we do, we
would need to make an adjustment somewhere in our overall

66

347 US 483 (1954).
See Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and
the Struggle for Racial Equality 295–308 (Oxford 2004) (discussing the evolving thinking
of Justices Felix Frankfurter and Robert H. Jackson, who initially thought school segregation morally wrong but probably constitutionally permissible, but who ultimately joined
the Brown majority in invalidating school segregation).
67

144

The University of Chicago Law Review

[84:123

scheme of substantive and methodological beliefs. The Reflective
Equilibrium Hypothesis posits that most of us who experience
ourselves as arguing in good faith would do so.
I hasten to add that I do not claim to have proved the Reflective Equilibrium Hypothesis as an empirical matter—only to
have shown that it offers an interpretation of the ideal of constitutional argumentation in good faith that is reasonably consistent
with the observable facts of constitutional argument in many if
not most of the contexts known to me. If the hypothesis fits constitutional argument in some contexts better than others, or if the
evidence persuades some that the justices of the Supreme Court
are indeed a breed apart—not honoring the obligations of argumentation in good faith to which many of us try to hold ourselves
and our interlocutors—then so be it.
When speaking in a normative voice, I am less equivocal: I
wholeheartedly endorse the second-order methodological approach that the Reflective Equilibrium Hypothesis models. In a
nutshell, that approach couples good sense concerning the extent
to which ex ante methodological commitments should control substantive outcomes in hard constitutional cases—especially those
with large practical consequences—with a realistic understanding of what good faith in constitutional argument minimally requires. No matter how much else we may disagree about, we
should agree that constitutional argument, which is transparently sensitive to substantive ideological judgment but also depends intrinsically on methodological premises, should proceed in
good faith.
CONCLUSION
The Reflective Equilibrium Hypothesis—which holds that
good-faith participants in constitutional debates test their methodological commitments against provisional judgments concerning the appropriate results in particular cases, and vice versa,
through a back and forth search for reflective equilibrium—offers
simultaneous responses to a number of puzzles and challenges.
Emerging as an inference to the most normatively attractive explanation of a number of phenomena within our constitutional
practice, the Reflective Equilibrium Hypothesis is at least a plausible alternative to the Cynical Conclusion that methodological
argumentation is entirely strategic and manipulative. The Reflective Equilibrium Hypothesis also illuminates the simultaneously
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backward- and forward-looking aspects of legitimate judicial authority, and it calls attention to the nearly pervasive indeterminacy of both actual and realistically imaginable first-order theories of constitutional interpretation. Perhaps most important, the
Reflective Equilibrium Hypothesis offers a coherent and attractive reconstruction of the nature of constitutional decision-making
in a practice in which methodological arguments and arguments
about the normative desirability of particular outcomes often
blend seamlessly.

